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War Every Day (eIraq Blog)
"I see a lot going on, but nothing is happening"

Noah Baker Merrill, Electronic Iraq

Feb 4, 2008

As February begins, a look at several key issues facing Iraq and Iraqis, not well addressed in the mainstream debate:

1. The growing rift between members of the Awakening Councils (largely composed of Sunni fighters who have been recently active in armed groups opposing the US military occupation) and the central government's Iraqi army and police (largely composed of members of sectarian-based Shiite militias affiliated with the current Iraqi government's major Shiite parties).

The fact that this conflict and (now) both of the forces on each side continue to be actively being funded and armed by the United States highlights the ongoing inability of US policymakers to look beyond divide-and-conquer strategies and work toward policies that might make space for real reconciliation efforts and unity based on inclusive, non-sectarian principles.

As several bloggers and commentators have pointed out throughout "the Surge", the decrease in attacks on US forces, and the corresponding reduction in Iraqi deaths, is largely the product of three factors:

  • The ceasefire observed by the Mahdi Army militia on the orders of its leader Moqtada Al-Sadr; the ceasefire is set to expire later this month, if not renewed
  • The fact that neighborhoods of Baghdad and many parts of Iraq have now been effectively cleansed of members of whatever minority communities formerly lived there (ie. Christians, Sunni Muslims in majority Shiite Muslim areas, or vice-versa, not to mention Mandeans or Ezidis, who have very few places to be safe in today's Iraq). [Note: Many people use the term Yezidis, a term many Ezidis find perjorative]
  • The co-optation by US forces (or of US forces, depending on your interpretation) of (or by, again, see above) several overwhelmingly Sunni armed groups, now called "Awakening Councils" or "Concerned Local Citizens", which has for the time being resulted in fewer attacks on American forces in exchange for the US funneling money and guns to these groups
But the increasing reliance by the United States military on "Awakening" forces in their military operations against groups who have not joined "the Awakening"  (read: "Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia") means that the US is essentially setting up two sides against each other - first by forming, arming, and training Iraqi Army and police forces hopelessly infiltrated by sectarian Shiite militia members, and then by creating "Awakening" forces overwhelming dominated by members of Sunni armed groups opposed to the current government's dominance by sectarian Shiite political groups.

What, we have to ask, will happen when newly re-armed and increasingly powerful "Awakening Councils" continue to operate essentially independently of the central Iraqi government? This is the gift that the US has given to Awakening forces -- essential total control in the areas in which they are based, with the support of US forces against any challengers. They will, it seems likely, emerge from this phase of US policy in Iraq  heavily armed, having solidified control over their areas of operation, and without strong needs to be associated with a discredited and largely irrelevant (in their eyes) central government.

Another set of lines in the next stage of Iraq's civil conflict are drawn (see here for analysis of comments on this over at Informed Comment), and groups on either side continue to find support from some actors in countries in the region with something to gain from an ongoing proxy war in Iraq (read: Saudi Arabia and Iran). And the US just announced plans to engage in one of the largest arms deals in history, effectively dumping $60 billion dollars of weapons into the hands of regimes opposing Iran in the region (including, notably for our purposes, Saudi Arabia).


2. The failed and failing "political process", where meaningful, reasoned conflict over significant issues is nearly always dismissed in the mainstream media as "Iraqis can't get along".

While the vital specifics (read: what laws and decisions will actually mean for Iraq's people) are ignored in service to the much-touted "benchmarks" used by Democrats to humiliate the Bush Administration, real, deeply significant issues are being decided for the future of Iraq, and there is a great deal of reasoned division between Iraqi political groupings regarding these essential issues.

And it's not about some unitary mythical Sunni community vs. some mythical unitary Shiite community (though the actions of armed groups with sectarian agendas have deep and horrific impacts on Iraqis' daily reality), it's about politics, resources, sovereignty, and who (which parties, not just which communities) will be included in participation in Iraq's future. Oh, and whether Iraq, as a unified state, will have a future, or whether it will be forcibly partitioned (either de facto or de jure) into three imposed smaller states on the basis of false and poorly-informed notions of a primal ethnic and sectarian inability to coexist which do not correspond to historical reality.

This shows up strongly in the debates surrounding:
  •  the new oil law (how much control should foreign oil companies get over Iraq's oil, and how should oil revenue be distributed (and which parties stand to benefit from which schemes);
  • agreements relating to the presence of US forces and bases in Iraq (some parties that stand to benefit from ongoing US military presence support this, while others oppose it -- and then there's the whole issue of whether or not the Iraqi parliament is even going to be consulted, or whether the Iraqi Prime Minister and the US President are just going to make the decision to keep a long-term us presence in Iraq themselves, as all signs indicate).

3. The ongoing displacement crisis, and the ways it is worsening. According to recent reports, new displacement did slow in 2007, perhaps in large part to the fact that there were fewer and fewer people to be newly displaced -- in other words, the sectarian cleansing and population transfer that surged through 2006 and into 2007 was largely complete by late 2007. This is not exactly a good thing.

As Iraqi is struck by an abnormally cold winter, and despite a very tiny percentage of returns to some parts of Baghdad, conditions of those who are still displaced are worsening dramatically. Those who fled often left at very short notice or did not expect to be away for what is for many becoming two or more years. While the need for shelter continues to be paramount, hunger and the need for medical care are also constant. And as a result of ongoing military activity and other violence, people are still being displaced, some for the second or third time, as Awakening councils and other groups see people not originally from the areas in which they are living as potential security threats. Read a recent press release from the International Organization for Migration- Iraq here.

The situation for refugees (the more than 2.25 million who have fled beyond the borders of Iraq to escape the violence and insecurity, and who have not yet returned) continues to deteriorate as well, as savings are exhausted, and international attention, slow to take notice and prompt a  response, fades as the news headlines tell us that things are better in Iraq, and that people are going home. A recent survey of Iraqis in Syria shows that those who have fled experience startlingly high rates of psychological trauma and other physical issues  that demand effective and urgent responses to prevent long-term repercussions.

All of this means that the humanitarian catastrophe that defines Iraq today is deepening, but the mainstream story is that things are better in Iraq. Funding for humanitarian aid both inside and outside Iraq is increasing, but it is still insignificant compared with the extent of the need, and it is very possible that the current increase in attention to programs serving Iraqi refugees, for instance, will stall in the coming months and years -- and they will need support for years, let's make no mistake.

Stopping or slowing wide-spread violence, at least for a short time, is an easy thing to do when compared with meaningful intervention to provide shelter, clean water, food, and medicine to people in desperate need. For that, you need real steps in the direction of peace-building. And that will take looking at Iraq and Iraqis as they are and as they desire to be, not as Americans think they are or should be. It will mean ending US policies of backing one set of political agendas against political groups with different views, whether on the national level or within communities themselves. It also means divorcing from American policy once and for all the belief that key US goals in Iraq - privileged corporate access to oil, long-term troop presence, regional dominance over Iran by proxy or directly - are synonymous by definition with goals that will allow for an Iraq at peace.

An Iraqi colleague recently shared an English translation of an Iraqi saying:

I see a lot going on, but nothing is happening.

If the shoe fits.






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